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ABSTRACT
Third party applications work on top of existing platforms
that host users’ data. Although these apps access this data
to provide users with specific services, they can also use it
for monetization or profiling purposes. In practice, there is
a significant gap between users’ privacy expectations and
the actual access levels of 3rd party apps, which are often
over-privileged. Due to weaknesses in the existing privacy
indicators, users are generally not well-informed on what
data these apps get. Even more, we are witnessing the rise of
inverse privacy : 3rd parties collect data that enables them
to know information about users that users do not know,
cannot remember, or cannot reach [2]. In this paper, we de-
scribe our recent experiences with the design and evaluation
of Data-Driven Privacy Indicators (DDPIs), an approach at-
tempting to reduce the aforementioned privacy gap. DDPIs
are realized through analyzing user’s data by a trusted party
(e.g., the app platform) and integrating the analysis results
in the privacy indicator’s interface. We discuss DDPIs in
the context of 3rd party apps on cloud platforms, such as
Google Drive and Dropbox. Specifically, we present our re-
cent work on Far-reaching Insights, which show users the
insights that apps can infer about them (e.g., their topics
of interest, collaboration and activity patterns etc.). Then
we present History-based insights, a novel privacy indicator
which informs the user on what data is already accessible by
an app vendor, based on previous app installations by the
user or her collaborators. We further discuss future ideas
on new DDPIs, and we outline the challenges facing the
wide-scale deployment of such indicators.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, we are witnessing the rise of the tech platform
economy [8]. A lot of successful software services reach a
point where their further growth necessitates opening their
products to third party developers via APIs. By creating
this ecosystem of 3rd parties, they essentially instigate the
network effect: the more the users of those apps, the more
valuable the underlying platform becomes. This has been the
motivation in the case of mobile platforms (e.g., Apple’s App
Store and Google Play Store), cloud platforms (e.g., Google
Drive’s and Dropbox’s app ecosystems), and social apps plat-
forms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn). These 3rd
party apps obtain access to users’ data via permission inter-
faces. Such permissions serve as the main privacy indicators
that users view before deciding on whether to authorize an
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app to access their data. However, these permissions are not
always easy to comprehend, which reduces their effectiveness
in deterring users from installing over-privileged apps. In
addition, due to continuous exposure to the same permissions
interface, users are prone to notice fatigue and habituation
effects [6].
By demonstrating the potential of Data Driven Privacy In-
dicators (DDPIs) in the cloud apps scenario, our aim is to
further contribute to transforming the static permissions
interface into a dynamic one that helps the user make more
informed decisions while minimizing the habituation effect.
The goal of DDPIs is not only to personalize the interface
based on the user’s background or privacy preferences as
suggested with personalized privacy notices [5]. They rather
aim to incorporate visualizations based on the user’s data
in the permissions interface itself. For example, these visu-
alizations indicate to the user what the app can concretely
extract about her or whether the app vendor already has
access to her data.
In the following section, we further explain the 3rd party
cloud apps’ ecosystem. In that context, we then present
two realizations of the DDPI paradigm in Sections 3 and 4.
We discuss in Section 5 other possible scenarios where a
similar approach can help. Finally, in Section 6, we explain
the challenges that DDPIs might face and their possible
shortcomings.
2. THIRD PARTY CLOUD APPS
Over the previous years, the apps that interact with users’
cloud files (on Dropbox, Box, Google Drive, etc.) have seen
traction at both the individual and the enterprise level. Such
apps provide a variety of services for most types of files
(document signing, PDF annotation, image styling, video
editing, etc.). On a high level, there are three entities that
interact in the third-party cloud app system: (1) a vendor
which is responsible for programming and managing a third-
party cloud app (or shortly a cloud app), (2) a user who
uses that app for achieving a certain service, and (3) a cloud
storage provider (CSP) hosting the user’s data.
With their data in the hands of these new potential adver-
saries, users are under increased risk of data leakage and
data-based profiling. Users’ files expose the topics they are
interested in, the entities they are mentioning the most, and
their sentiments towards various subjects. Their photos
expose the faces of people they are frequently with, the loca-
tions they have been to, and what activities they have been
doing. The hundreds of millions of users who might trust
Google Drive or Dropbox with their data do not necessarily
trust all these 3rd party apps’ developers. This becomes even
more critical in the context of enterprises. In a lot of cases,
enterprises have special agreements with Google or Dropbox
on how the data is handled, where it is stored, and how
long it is retained. This is not necessarily the case with 3rd
party apps, which might not even display a privacy policy
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Figure 1: Example of the current permissions interface of
Google Drive
to begin with. Employees installing 3rd party apps are then
exposing the enterprise data to potentially unaccountable
entities. Based on the above, there is a growing need for more
effective privacy notices in the context of 3rd party cloud
apps. In the next two sections, we discuss our experience
with multiple privacy indicators in the context of Google
Drive, one of the most popular 3rd party ecosystems. For
reference, Figure 1 shows the current permissions interface of
Google Drive. In this ecosystem, we differentiate on a high
level between two types of access that apps can request: (1)
full access, where the app can view all the files in the user’s
account and (2) partial access, where the app can only view
the files that the user has opened or created with the app
itself.
3. IMMEDIATE AND FAR-REACHING IN-
SIGHTS
In this section, we describe the design and evaluation of
Immediate Insights and Far-reaching Insights, two privacy
indicators that help users concretize what the adversary can
potentially infer from their data. An extended version of
this section appeared in our recent work [4]. However, our
goal here is to summarize the high-level findings which fit
the discussion on DDPIs.
3.1 Motivation
In a previous work, we have shown that almost two-thirds
of the featured Google Drive apps on Google Chrome store
are over-privileged: they request more permissions than they
need to function [4]. An app that is meant to crop a single
photo might request access to all the users files. The current
model has no indicator of whether the app is over-privileged.
Moreover, users might not necessarily understand the real risk
of exposing their files. Hence, we were motivated to develop
new privacy indicators in the form of two new permission
models.
3.2 Description
3.2.1 Immediate Insights
The first model is based on the following hypothesis:
“When users are shown samples of the data that can be ex-
tracted from the unneeded permissions granted to apps, they
are less likely to authorize these apps.”
We call this model Immediate Insights (IM), and we show
an instance of it in Figure 2. On the left of the figure,
we distinguish the needed from the unneeded permissions1.
On the right, we have the Insights Area, where we show a
question that says: “What do the unneeded permissions
say about you?”, followed by an answer in the form of a
visual with short explanatory text. In Figure 2, the Insights
Area visualizes the map Location of a randomly chosen user
photo. We have also developed three more variations, where
the Insights Area shows a random Image, a random excerpt
from a Text file, or a random Collaborator.
3.2.2 Far-reaching Insights
The second model we introduced was based on the following
hypothesis:
“When the users are shown the far-reaching information that
can be inferred from the unneeded permissions granted to
apps, they are less likely to authorize these apps.”
These are insights that go beyond direct data examples
and include what can be inferred by running more involved
algorithms. Hence, we denote this model by Far-reaching
Insights (or shortly FR Insights). The interface layout is
the same as that of Figure 2, but with the Insights Area
containing an FR insight instead of an immediate insight.
In this work, we have designed 6 types of FR insights that
can be extracted from users’ data. For textual files we
had (1) an insight showing the Entities, Concepts, and
Topics (ECT) extracted (Figure 3), (2) an insight showing
the Sentiments towards entities (Figure 4), (3) and an
insight showing the Shared Interests between the user and
various collaborators (Figure 5). For image files, we had (1)
an insight, Faces with Context, showing the most frequent
faces along with the objects appearing with them (Figure 6)
and (2) another insight, Faces On Map, showing a map of
where these faces and objects were captured, based on their
geotags (Figure 7). Finally, we had an additional insight that
showed the user’s Top Collaborators (appears in Figure 12
of the Appendix).
3.3 Experimental Setup
In order to test the efficacy of both Immediate and Far-
reaching insights, we conducted an online user experiment.
For brevity purposes, we will provide a high-level description
of the setup and methodology. We refer the reader to our
full paper for the full description of the setup, methodology,
apps used, and data handling [4].
3.4 Setup and Methodology
We recruited users online via our university’s mailing list and
website. The experiment could be completed from any user’s
web browser (i. e., without supervision). We required that
users sign with their Google Drive account after reading the
privacy policy. Only users who had at least 10 files containing
text or 20 images were allowed to continue. This is to ensure
that they possess at least a minimal level of experience with
Google Drive. As an incentive, random participants were
rewarded by gift cards for app stores of their choice. The
first goal of the experiment was to investigate the efficacy of
the two new permission models by comparing them to the
existing Google Drive permission model. The second goal
was to perform micro-comparisons among the different types
1The details of how the unneeded permissions are determined
are available in [4].
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of IM and FR. Accordingly, we went for a mixed between-
subject and within-subject design. As far as these permission
models are concerned, we had three experimental groups:
• Baseline group (BL group): Users in this group
were presented with a clone of the original interface
that Google shows upon installing the app (shown in
Figure 1). This group serves as the control group, and
we refer to it as BL.
• Immediate Insights Group (IM group): Users in
this group were presented with the modified interface
of Figure 2, with the Insights area containing one of
the IM insights of Section 3.2.1.
• Far-reaching Insights Group (FR group): Users
in this group were presented with the modified interface,
of Figure 2, with the Insights Area containing the FR
insights described in Section 3.2.2.
The experiment itself was composed of a series of app selec-
tion tasks. In each task, the user was required to choose an
app with a specific purpose from a list of apps. We show
this interface in Figure 9 of the Appendix. Only one app
on the list satisfied the indicated purpose. When the user
clicked on the app, she was presented with the permission
dialog corresponding to its group (i.e., that of Figure 1 for
the BL group and that of Figure 2 with a randomly selected
visual for the IM or FR Insights groups). The user was then
presented with a question that says: “Based on permissions
below, would you be likely to install this app?”. She could
choose between “Permissions are too invasive” (accept) and
“I’m OK with these permissions” (reject). We worded the
question so that we avoid all users rejecting the installations
of all apps. We rather aimed that users would reject apps
whose permissions they consider as too invasive, thus allow-
ing us to do within-subject comparisons. After answering
the question, the user was directed to the next task with
another app, until she completed the whole set of tasks. Fig-
ures 10, 11 and 12 of the Appendix show screenshots of the
interface for the BL, IM and FR experimental groups. The
apps were presented to the users in randomized order to
compensate for the effects of learning and fatigue. We also
avoided using apps from popular vendors to avoid the bias
resulting from users being influenced by famous brands.
3.5 Findings
We had 160 users in total who successfully completed this
part of the experiment. Out of them, 55 were in the BL
Group, 54 in the IM Insights group, and 51 in the FR group.
The metric we used in our evaluation was the Acceptance
Likelihood AL, defined as:
AL =
#(Accepts)
#(Accepts) + #(Rejects)
, (1)
where Accepts denotes the cases where users were fine with
the permissions, and Rejects denotes the cases where they
found them too invasive. Accepts and Rejects were aggre-
gated across users and tasks for the permission model under
consideration. The lower the AL, the better the perfor-
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mance in deterring users from installing over-privileged apps.
To evaluate the significance of the AL differences among
the interface types, we fit a generalized linear mixed model
(GLMM) with the user’s decision (Accepting/Rejecting the
app installation) as the binary response variable and the in-
terface type as the fixed effect. The most important outcomes
from our experiment can be summarized as follows:
Inefficacy of Baseline Permissions: We found that the
baseline interface had a significantly higher AL (i.e. p-values≤
0.05) than all the insights, except for the Collaborator insight.
This highlights the fact that showing well-selected insights
will result in deterring more users compared to the case of
not showing any insights.
The Power of Relational Insights: We found out that
users are significantly more deterred by Relational Insights,
characterizing their relationships with other people (FacesWith-
Context, TopCollaborators, and SharedInterests insights),
than by Personal Insights, characterizing the users them-
selves (Image, Text, ECT, and Sentiments insights).
Impact of Face Recognition: We also noticed that show-
ing examples of user’s images (AL = 0.21) is significantly
less effective than showing the important faces and listing
the concepts in the image (AL = 0.08). This supports the
hypothesis that we need to go beyond simple examples to
achieve a deterring effect on users.
Influence of High-Level Textual Insights: Contrary
to the case of images, in the case of textual documents,
showing the high-level entities or concepts extracted from
the text did not have a significant difference as compared to
simply showing direct excerpts from the text (p-value= 0.94).
Only when the relationship factor is introduced does the AL
significantly decrease (as in the case of SharedInterests).
Superiority of Far-reaching Insights: By aggregating
the results over all the experiments with FR Insights, we
obtained a significantly lower AL value compared to IM
Insights (AL = 0.161 and 0.226 respectively). We also con-
firmed that the AL difference is significant with a pairwise
comparison p-value= 0.004). Overall, these results demon-
strate the superiority of our novel approach of FR Insights.
Nevertheless, IM Insights are still significantly better than
the BL model.
4. HISTORY-BASED INSIGHTS
In this section, we present History-based Insights (shortly HB
Insights), another privacy indicator that realizes the DDPIs
paradigm.
4.1 Motivation
Users of cloud storage services typically share files among
each other so that multiple people can view or edit these files.
When a user installs 3rd party cloud apps, those apps’ vendors
can get access to her files. Similarly, when her collaborators
install apps, the corresponding vendors get access to files
shared between the user and those collaborators. If the user
is subsequently given a choice between an app whose vendor
already has access to (part of) her data and an app from a
totally new vendor, it makes sense, from a privacy angle, to
go with the first. This minimizes the number of potential
adversaries that get access to her data. It is particularly
useful when the user wants to choose among apps with similar
functionalities and permission levels. However, the current
privacy indicators are not equipped to help users take such
Figure 8: History-based Insights interface
decisions when they make sense. The permissions interface
is totally independent of the current shareholders of a user’s
data. For that reason, we introduce HB Insights, which is a
new privacy indicator that informs the user about how much
of her files is already accessible by the app vendor.
4.2 Description
We continue to consider Google Drive as a case study, and
we show this indicator in the context of Google Drive apps’
permissions in Figure 8. Compared to the current interface
provided by Google (Figure 1), we added a new part to high-
light the percentage of user files accessible by the vendor (due
to user’s or collaborators’ previous decisions). Following the
best practices in privacy indicators’ design [6], our indicator
was multilayered, with both textual and visual components.
The wording of the main textual part was brief and general
enough to hold for both data percentage exposed by friends
and that exposed by the user. We used a percentage value
rather than a qualitative measure to facilitate making com-
parisons among apps based on this value. The visual part
showed the percentage as a progress bar with a neutral violet
color. The bottom textual part was added in a smaller font
to provide further explanation for those interested.
In order to evaluate the new permissions interface, we per-
formed an online user study. Again, we will be giving a
high-level overview of the experiment, and we leave the full
details to an upcoming paper. The hypothesis we wanted to
test was the following:
“Introducing the new privacy indicator will significantly in-
crease the probability that the user chooses an app with a
minimal incremental privacy loss.”
4.3 Setup and Methodology
We recruited users via CrowdFlower’s crowdsourcing plat-
form. In our study, we restricted participation, via the
platform’s filtering system, to the highest quality contribu-
tors (Performance Level 3). We also geographically targeted
countries where English is a main language as our interface
was only in English. In order to further guarantee quality
responses, each user was rewarded a small amount of $0.5
for merely completing the survey and an additional amount
4
of $1.25 that is manually bonused for those who do not enter
irrelevant text in the free-text fields.
Participants were first presented with introductory instruc-
tions that explained the context of the study (i. e., cloud
storage services and 3rd party apps that can be connected
to them). They were asked to only continue if they had
good familiarity with cloud storage services (e. g., Google
Drive, Dropbox, etc.). The introductory survey was then
front-loaded with questions about cloud storage services (sev-
eral of which required free-text input) in order to discourage
users who had not used these services from continuing to the
actual study. We did not explicitly require that participants
have experience with 3rd party cloud apps. However, we
educated them about such apps throughout the instructions,
particularly showing them two examples of 3rd party apps
in action (PandaDoc for signing documents and iLoveIMG
for cropping photos). These apps were displayed via ani-
mated GIFs that play automatically and do not rely on the
user clicking. We used limited deception by neither men-
tioning the focus of the study on participants’ privacy nor
giving hints about selecting apps based on the installation
history. The advertised purpose was to “check how people
make decisions when they install 3rd party apps.”
Next, users could proceed to the study page. We used a
split-plot design in the study. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two groups:
• Baseline Group: where the permissions interface
used is that currently provided by Google Drive (Fig-
ure 1).
• HB Insights Group: where the new permissions
interface of Figure 8 is used.
In each group, the study consisted of 3 modules, which cover
the main conditions that can occur when users desire to
install a cloud app.
• Module 1 (Self-History Scenario) tests whether
the user is more likely to select an app from the same
vendor she has just installed from before (Figure 14 of
the Appendix).
• Module 2 (Collaborator’s Vendor Scenario) tests
the likelihood that the participant selects the same app
(or an app from the same vendor) as her collaborator
(Figure 15 of the Appendix).
• Module 3 (Multiple Collaborators Scenario) given
collaborators fmore and fless, where the user shares
much more data with fmore, this scenario checks the
likelihood of the participant authorizing an app that
fmore has installed (Figure 16 of the Appendix).
In each module, the user reads the instructions (Figure 13
of the Appendix) and proceeds to a set of tasks. One of
those tasks involves selecting between two apps. The metric
we used in our evaluation was the likelihood of selecting
the more privacy preserving app (i.e., the app requiring the
minimal additional access).
4.4 Findings
We had 141 users who successfully completed the experiment.
Out of them, 72 were in the Baseline group and 69 in the
HB Insights group. The outcomes of our experiment can be
summarized as follows:
Superiority of the HB Insights: In the three modules,
the Baseline group witnessed an almost even split between
the app whose vendor has access to zero (or small) percentage
of the user’s files on one side and the app from a vendor who
has access to all (or most) of the user’s files on the other side.
The percentage of users who favored the former ranged from
41.7% to 55.6%. On the other hand, participants in the HB
Insights group were significantly more likely to install the
more privacy preserving app than those in the Baseline group.
The percentage of users who did so ranged from 75.4% to
88.4%. On average, the new privacy indicator has increased
the likelihood of users choosing more privacy-preserving apps
by 30%. This validates our hypothesis that introducing a
DDPI, based on the user’s installation history, can serve
to minimize the privacy loss resulting from an increasing
number of data shareholders.
User Motivations: Privacy was not the only motivation
for users to favor apps from vendors with existing access
to their data. A significant fraction of users in Module 1
has mentioned cross-app compatibility, interface familiarity,
and satisfaction with the previous vendor as justifications
for their decisions. In Module 2, users added that they were
motivated by their friends’ choices (i. e., took them as rec-
ommendations). Still, 17% of the participants in the HB
Insights group explicitly mentioned privacy as the reason
behind their choices. Interestingly, the HB Insights inter-
face has indirectly made users think about various positive
effects, which lead them to make more privacy-preserving
decisions. This might also be achievable in other DDPI in-
stances, where users’ data can be used to highlight the
other advantages of taking privacy-aware decisions.
For example, the user can be encouraged to select more con-
servative privacy preferences by showing her that protecting
her data might have financial benefits, such as avoiding price
discrimination.
Willingness to Participate: At the end of the user study,
users were presented with a final set of questions. We asked
them whether they would like to be notified when a friend
installs an app that gets access to their shared files. Around
92% of users in the Baseline group and 90% of users in
the HB group agreed. We further asked the participants
whether they are fine with a collaborator being notified
when they install applications that access files shared with
that collaborator. The percentage of people who agreed
dropped to 75% in the Baseline and 78% in the HB group.
The difference between the answers to these two questions
highlights that only a minority of users is not willing to make
the trade-off of contributing to the overall system. Such users
can be given the option to not use privacy indicators based
on their friends’ decisions.
5. FURTHER APPLICATIONS OF DDPI
So far, we have presented three instances of DDPIs that we
have tested in the context of cloud apps privacy. Immediate
Insights, Far-reaching Insights, and History-based Insights
all communicate a privacy message to the user by leveraging
her actual data. Moreover, all of them are shown as a part
of the app authorization process. In this section, we discuss
how DDPIs can be extended to other platforms and how they
can be used as privacy indicators after the app is installed.
Previous Works in Other Ecosystems: To begin with,
there have been a few works that also followed the DDPI
paradigm in other ecosystems. Most notably, Harbach et
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al., proposed to integrate examples from user’s data in the
permissions request screen to expose the data apps can get
access to [3]. This involved showing random pictures, call
logs, location, and contacts from user’s data that correspond
to each permission. Another related work in the context
of Facebook is that by Wang et al. [7], who introduced the
“Privacy Nudges” technique to aid users while posting sta-
tuses to Facebook through showing random profile pictures
of friends who can see the post or showing the post sen-
timent. With Far-reaching Insights, our aim was to show
that well-crafted visuals extracted from users’ data can be
more effective than randomly selected data. We also showed
through pairwise comparisons among the insights themselves
that the choice of the displayed insight highly affects the
interface’s effectiveness.
Extensions of FR and HB Insights: Looking forward,
it is obvious how a direct extension of FR Insights and HB
Insights can work in mobile or social networking plat-
forms. These same indicators can also work with browser
extensions that unnecessarily request access to a user’s web
history. The only difference will be the type of user’s data
that is visualized. Moreover, in the scenario of 3rd party
apps’ installation, we can introduce DDPIs that visualize
the network of 4th party entities that can get access to
the user’s data. These can be advertisement providers, data
brokers, or even governmental agencies. Another DDPI can
be used to visualize the location where the user’s data
will be hosted and accordingly the jurisdictions governing
the data handling.
New DDPIs: There are other scenarios where new types
of DDPIs can be introduced. One scenario is helping users
visualize the consequences of privacy settings. When
the user is presented with the option to encrypt her disk
or phone, a special privacy indicator can show her how
others view her data as a result. Another example is in
the context of selective encryption. A lot of solutions allow
users to selectively encrypt some sensitive folders before
syncing them to cloud storage services. However, encryption
comes with a trade-off: most apps do not typically operate
on encrypted files. DDPIs can be used to visualize which
of the user’s apps still operate after she encrypts the
folder in question.
Post Installation Scenario: Furthermore, since DDPIs
depend on the user’s data, they are not exclusively valid at
app installation time. For example, a cloud provider can
show the user far-reaching insights that a 3rd party app can
glean from files it has actually downloaded (as opposed to
what it can potentially access). This also deters the apps
from accessing unneeded files as the user would be better
equipped to discover such events. One notable realization of
post-installation DDPIs was the work by Almuhimedi et al.,
where users are notified about how frequently their location
data is being queried by mobile apps [1].
6. LIMITATIONS
For DDPIs to be deployed on a wide scale, the privacy
motivation is not sufficient. There are several issues that can
stand in that way.
The Business Case: First, there should be a business
advantage for the platform owner to engage in such change.
On the surface, providing the users with interfaces that deter
them from installing certain 3rd party apps might seem as a
growth-curtailing step for the platform. However, the fact
that privacy itself has recently become a major selling point
for several companies might serve as a business motivation
for the app platforms.
The Economic Cost: From an economic perspective, DDPIs
might result in an extra computational and development over-
load. This is due to the various data analysis and machine
learning techniques that might be needed in the privacy in-
dicator. In a lot of cases, however, the platform already
analyzes the user’s files for other purposes, such as improving
search (e.g. Google Photos analyzes user photos for finding
objects and faces). Hence, the privacy indicators can build
on existing data that is readily extracted by the platform,
without additional cost.
Usability Challenges: Introducing DDPIs should not neg-
atively impact the usability of the platform. Evidently, bom-
barding users with several privacy indicators at once and
allowing indicators to have conflicting messages will result in
user frustration. A key point in successfully deploying these
indicators is to deliver a succinct privacy-related message
in a concrete way that is tailored to the user. Hence, an
important area of potential research is how to prioritize the
message to deliver to the user in order to give her the best
privacy level within a minimal attention span.
Trusting the Provider: Finally, it is important to note
that in several scenarios, the user is assumed to trust the
platform itself to perform the data analysis and construct
the privacy indicator. Nevertheless, this assumption is not
an additional requirement imposed by DDPIs. It is rather
an existing assumption that users make whenever they host
their data on the platform itself.
7. FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we have presented our work on Data-Driven
Privacy Indicators (DDPIs) for 3rd party cloud apps. In a
nutshell, DDPIs communicate privacy messages in a language
the user understands most: her own data. We presented three
instances of DDPIs: Immediate Insights and Far-reaching
insights from our previous work [4] and History-based insights
which we have newly developed. Despite their limited spread
in real world systems, DDPIs have the potential to reduce
the habituation effect of privacy notices due to their inherent
dynamicity. With the rising trend of personal assistants
delivering virtually any service, privacy personal assistants
might soon become commonplace. Such trusted privacy
“coaches” can benefit from research around DDPIs in order to
better relay the consequences of data collection or of specific
privacy settings. This is especially useful in voice-based
assistants, where the goal is to relay a short, understandable
message to the user. As research around DDPIs shows,
involving users’ data in these messages will create a greater
user inclination towards more privacy-preserving options.
In the future, we plan to continue our work on DDPIs in the
cloud scenario and to further introduce new ways of assisting
users in that context. So far, we have developed PrivySeal,
a privacy-focused assistant which uses Far-reaching insights
to deter users from installing over-privileged cloud apps.
PrivySeal is available for public at https://privyseal.epfl.ch
and has been used by over 1500 registered users. We further
aim at complementing DDPIs with data-based, actionable
recommendations too (e.g. suggesting privacy-preserving
apps to use). That way, users are not only informed but are
also guided towards the most privacy-preserving options.
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Figure 9: Task interface presented for the users in the experiment, where they had to select the app satisfying the given
purpose (already highlighted for them)
Figure 10: Example interface shown to users of the BL group, with the decision dialog on top
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Figure 11: Example interface shown to users of the IM group, with the decision dialog on top
Figure 12: Example interface shown to users of the FR group, with the decision dialog on top
Experiment 1/4:
Take a breath.
You will now play a role of someone who has a Google Drive account and has already stored  les on it (like
your images from your trips with the family, some o cial documents, music  les, etc.).
At some point, you'll be asked to choose some apps to connect to your Google Drive account. Although no
apps will be actually installed, we ask you to think as if they were real apps and that this is a real Google Drive
account.
Once you install an app, assume it is still installed throughout this experiment.
For example, if the  rst tasks says: "you have installed an application from the company pandadoc.com",
this application is still there when you go to the next task. So if the second task says: "who has access to
your data?", the answer would be "pandadoc.com company".
Similarly, whenever you are informed that your friends have installed applications, consider that these
applications are still connected to their Google Drive throughout this experiment.
When this experiment ends and you move to the next experiment, you will start from scratch (i.e. with no
apps installed).
OK. Let's start.wFigure 13: Instructions for each module experiment of Section 4.3
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Task:  
As explained, we now start from scratch. Consider that this is the  rst app you will install. Please install any
application from the company: thetimetube.com. (Only one such app exists, and you can click
on the app to view its info.)
Your choice is installing this application: Video to GIF Converter
Click to con rm.w
Video to GIF Converter
Company:
thetimetube.com
Description:
This app allows you to create animated GIFs from videos directly. You can open a video  le from your Google Drive and computer.
Photo Editor
Task:  
You now need an app that allows scanning your Google Drive  les for viruses. 
Two such apps exist below. Check them both by clicking on them. Then choose the one that you prefer to
install.  
Be prepared to give a reason for that choice.
Please provide a brief reason for favoring the app NitroSafe over the app Malware Scanner
Examples of bad reasons (that don't qualify for bonus):
This app is better.
NitroSafe allows me to do the indicated functionality (like scan my  les, listen to music, convert documents, etc.)
NitroSafe is very good and does what I need.
I like NitroSafe more.
NitroSafe is easy to use.
Style of a good reason (to qualify for bonus):
Your reason should indicate something about/related to NitroSafe that made you favor it over Malware Scanner
Click to con rm.w
NitroSafe
Figure 14: The 2 tasks for Module 1 (Self-History Scenario)
Task:  
Google Drive allows you to share  les with friends. You decided to share all your photos on
Google Drive with your friend John . Up till now, who is the friend who has access to your data?
 John 
 Lisa 
Click to con rm.w
Task:  
Your friend John  has installed an application called Photo Editor and has given its company
access to all his  les (including shared  les). Write below the name of the company that owns this application.  
(You can click on the app to view its info.)
Company:  w
Click to con rm.w
Photo Editor
Company:
mediamania.com
Description:
An online image editor: Edit your images, adjust and add e ects online in your browser.
Online Audio Converter
Task:  
You now need an app that allows converting all audio  les on Google Drive to MP3 format. 
Two such apps exist below. Check them both by clicking on them. Then choose the one that you prefer to
install.  
Be prepared to give a reason for that choice.
Please provide a brief reason for favoring the app Mediamania Converter over the app Online Audio Converter
Examples of bad reasons (that don't qualify for bonus):
This app is better.
Mediamania Converter allows me to do the indicated functionality (like scan my  les, listen to music, convert documents, etc.)
Mediamania Converter is very good and does what I need.
I like Mediamania Converter more.
Mediamania Converter is easy to use.
Style of a good reason (to qualify for bonus):
Your reason should indicate something about/related to Mediamania Converter that made you favor it over Online Audio Converter
Click to con rm.w
Mediamania Converter
Task:  
Your friend John  has installed an application called Online Player and has given its company
access to all his  les (including shared  les). Write below the name of the company that owns this application.  
(You can cl ck on the app to view its info.)
Company:  w
Click to con rm.w
Online Player
Company:
driveplayer.com
Description:
Music and Audio  les player for Google Drive.
Online Audio Converter
Task:  
You now need an app that allows playing your music  les that are saved on Google Drive. 
Two such apps exist below. Check them both by clicking on them. Then choose the one that you prefer t
install.  
Be prepared to give a reason for that choice.
Please provide a brief reason for favoring the app Enjoy Music Player over the app Online Player
Examples of b d reasons (that don't qualify for bonus):
This app is better.
Enjoy Music Player allows me to do the indicated functionality (like scan my  les, listen to music, convert documents, etc.)
Enjoy Music Player is very good and does what I need.
I like Enjoy Music Player more.
Enjoy Music Player is easy to use.
Style of a good reason (to qualify for bonus):
Your reason should indicate something about/related to Enjoy Music Player that made you favor it over Online Player
Click to con rm.w
Enjoy Music Player
Figure 15: The 5 tasks of Module 2 (Collaborator’s Vendor Scenario)
-->
Task:  
Assume that you have shared all your photos with John . Additionally, you have shared with Lisa
 some of your photos. Who has more  les from you in their Google Drive?
 John 
 Lisa 
Click to con rm.w
Task:  
Your friend Lisa  has installed an application called PDF Mergy and has given its company access
to all her  les (including shared  les). Write below the name of the company that owns this application.  
(You can click on the app to view its info.)
Company:  w
Click to con rm.w
PDF Mergy
Company:
mytools.com
Description:
Allows to merge PDF  les from your Google Drive with a simple interface.
PDF to Word
Task:  
Your friend John  has installed an application called PDF Files Merger and has given its company
access to all his  les (including shared  les). Write below the name of the company that owns this application.  
(You can click on the app to view its info.)
Company:  w
Click to con rm.w
PDF Files Merger
Company:
smarts le.com
Description:
PDF merge - Allows you to merge your Google Drive pdf  les easy and fast.
PDF to Word Doc Converter
Task:  
You now need an app that allows you to merge multiple PDF documents on your Google
Drive into a single PDF  le. 
Two such apps exist below. Check them both by clicking on them. Then choose the one that you prefer to
install.  
Be prepar d to give a reason for tha  choice.
Please provide a brief reason for favoring the app PDF Mergy over the app PDF Files Merger
Examples of bad reasons (that don't qualify for bonus):
This app is better.
F Mergy allows me to d  the indicat d unction lity (like scan my  les, listen to music, convert documents, etc.)
PDF Mergy is very good and does what I need.
I like PDF Mergy more.
PDF Mergy is easy to use.
Style of a good reason (to qualify for bonus):
Your reason should indicate something about/related to PDF Mergy that made you favor it over PDF Files Merger
Click to con rm.w
Figure 16: The 4 tasks of Module 3 (Multiple Collaborators Scenario)
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